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Abstract
Theories of firm profitability make diﬀerent predictions about the
relative importance of firm, industry and time specific factors. We
assess, empirically, the relevance of these eﬀects over a sixteen year
period in India, as a regime of control and regulation, pre 1985, gave
way to partial liberalisation between 1985 and 1991 and to more deci-
sive liberalisation after 1991. We find that firm eﬀects are important
throughout, when rent seeking opportunities proliferated, as well as
when competitive forces were enhanced by institutional change. In
contrast, industry eﬀects significantly increased after liberalisation,
suggesting that industry structure matters more within competitive
markets. These findings help understand the relevance of diﬀerent
models over diﬀerent stages of liberalisation, and have important im-
plications for both theory and policy.
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1 Introduction
There is general agreement across the disciplines of economics, finance and
management, that firms attempt to maximise profits. At the same time,
empirical studies highlight large variation in profitability, where some firms
tend to be consistently more profitable than the others. Understandably,
the literature contains a multitude of theoretical models that predict which
firms will earn higher rates of return and what market and macroeconomic
conditions support higher profitability. The predictions of these models are
divergent, and in particular, diﬀer in the extent to which firm, industry and
time specific factors explain variation in firm level profitability.
In this paper, we study the determinants of profitability of Indian firms
against the backdrop of economic reforms. Using a proprietary dataset on
Indian firms, we evaluate the relative importance of firm versus industry
eﬀects, as well as time eﬀects, in explaining the variation in profitability
for a panel of firms over the sixteen year period from 1980-81 to 1995-96.
The period under study straddles the most important epoch in the recent
history of the Indian economy, as the opening up of markets took place with
the liberalisation of industrial policies in 1991. Our analysis covers three
well-defined institutional eras for contemporary India, where each sub-period
covers a unique phase in the process of liberalisation. Thus, in addition to
firm, industry and time eﬀects, our study includes the eﬀect of institutional
change. The results support the predictions from some theoretical models
but not others, and have important policy implications.
According to the mainstream Bain-Mason structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) paradigm (Bain, 1951, 1956; Mason, 1939, 1957), an explanation for
the empirical relationship between concentration and industry profits is mar-
ket power. Higher concentration, predicated by industry specific factors (Sut-
ton, 1991), facilitates the exercise of market power by large firms, thereby
generating superior profits. This view posits that industry structure matter
most, holding constant firm level factors such as minimum eﬃcient scale and
advertising and R&D intensities. Further, time eﬀects embodied in demand
conditions are also important (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986).
An alternative perspective on industrial organization and performance
(Stigler, 1950, 1968; Demsetz, 1973; Mancke, 1974) has suggested that the
positive relationship between size, market structure and profitability arises
because larger firms are more eﬃcient. They earn higher profits, and thereby
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contribute to increased industry concentration. This view constitutes the ba-
sis for theoretical models, like Jovanovic (1982), where firm eﬀects reflecting
productivity and eﬃciency constitute the main reason for profitability dif-
ferences between firms, while the distribution of eﬃciencies and industry life
cycle together determine market structure. A third view, arising from the
financial economics literature (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), particularly the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), predicts that firm eﬀects are impor-
tant in combination with aggregate market conditions or time eﬀects.
In line with alternative perspectives, a large and rich empirical literature
has evolved in industrial organisation. The mainstream literature (Bass et
al., 1978; Cubbin and Geroski, 1987) has focussed on explaining firms’ prof-
itability levels by market structure related factors (industry eﬀects), though
Mueller (1977), reporting significant firm level profitability persistence over
time, first highlighted the validity of the firm eﬀect. On the other hand, the-
oretical foundations underlying firms’ specific competencies that predicate
profitability have been developed in the management literature, most promi-
nently by Wernerfelt (1984), Rumelt (1991) and Nelson (1991). While early
work of Schmalensee (1985) established industry eﬀects to be dominant in
explaining profit variations across firms, led by Rumelt (1991) a number of
studies have pointed to firm eﬀects as being the primary factor.
Yet, a balanced approach, that both firm and industry eﬀects are impor-
tant, is suggested in other work (Kessides, 1990; Waring, 1996; Wernerfelt
and Montgomery, 1988). This literature has generated substantial debate,
because of large variation between studies on the estimated importance of
firm-eﬀects, but also the related question of appropriate data and methodol-
ogy (Schmalensee, 1989). In a relatively recent contribution closely related
to the current paper, Slade (2004) puts to test four competing models of
firm profitability, using panel data on large firms in 14 mining and refining
markets over a five year period. She finds empirical support only for the
mainstream market structure model.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the causal eﬀect of product-market
structure on profitability may be somewhat more relevant for emerging mar-
kets. Indeed, while the SCP paradigm has lost prominence in mainstream
IO research, such studies are relatively more common in economies that are
in transition or in early stages of development (Slade, 2004). This is also
consistent with the view that, in more advanced semi-industrial countries
such as India, manufacturing sectors tend to be monopolistic (Singh, 2003).
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Further, this hypothesis implies a potentially important role for institu-
tional change, so that as the economy makes the transition towards a market
economy, the importance of firm eﬀects would start to dominate industry ef-
fects. If the performance of firms in an emerging economy are to be evaluated,
assuming absence of institutional eﬀects is untenable, given the rapid insti-
tutional changes taking place within these economies. Institutional factors
matter greatly in influencing economic performance in emerging economy
contexts (Hall and Jones, 1999), and the inclusion of these institutional ef-
fects is important in evaluating the long-run performance of firms in emerging
or developing economies.
In this paper, we evaluate the importance of firm versus industry eﬀects
for an important emerging economy, India, against the backdrop of economic
reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. Our investigation of institutional ef-
fects in this context is new to the literature, and has important implications
for theory and policy. We address the issues of whether industry eﬀects
are important in emerging markets such as India, the extent to which firm
eﬀects are significant, both in an absolute sense and relative to industry ef-
fects, and whether firm and industry eﬀects have changed over the period
of institutional transition. Institutional conditions have been extremely im-
portant in influencing industrial performance in India (Bardhan, 2005) and
in shaping firms’ strategic decision making (Marathe, 1989; Mohan and Ag-
garwal, 1990). We take into account the prevalent conditions and introduce
institutions as a key element influencing returns.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the
existing literature, describe the Indian context and state our expectations for
the sub-periods studied. Section 3 describes our data and empirical model,
and provides details of the econometric procedures. This is followed in section
4 by a discussion of our empirical results and their implications. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 Literature and Institutional Backdrop
2.1 Models of firm profitability
We briefly discuss three theoretical models of firm profitability, each making
diﬀerent predictions about the main driver of corporate profitability. The
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focus of our discussion lies in the implications of these models for the rela-
tive importance of firm, industry and time eﬀects, and potential interactions
between industry and time eﬀects. Later in the paper, we evaluate empiri-
cally the magnitude of these eﬀects, in absolute and relative terms, as well as
changes over diﬀerent stages of institutional transition. All the three models
are discussed in further detail in Slade (2004).
2.1.1 Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm
The SCP paradigm was the workhorse of the IO literature during the 1970s
and 1980s. It posits that market structure (mainly size and concentration of
the market) drives conduct (inter-firm interactions, mainly competition and
collusion) which in turn determines firm performance (profitability). Follow-
ing Mason (1939) and Bain (1951, 1956), the main channels for this causal
relationship was held to be economies of scale and scope, closely related to
structure, and that higher returns in a market were driven by monopoly
power.
Under the model, profitability (πi) for the ith firm in industry j is deter-
mined by concentration in the market (typically measured by the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index, HHIj) and firm level explanatory factors (xi) such as min-
imum eﬃcient scale and advertising and R&D intensities. Hence, the model
places emphasis on industry eﬀects and can potentially also include firm ef-
fects. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) extend the model to include business
cycle eﬀects, where degree of collusion varies with demand and so does con-
centration and profit margin.1 In this case, one would have additional time
eﬀects either on their own or interacted with industry eﬀects.
For our purpose here, the main prediction of the SCP model is that in-
dustry eﬀects should be large and further, a causal determinant for variation
in profitability across firms. However, empirical research based on the model
has been criticised on the grounds that the explanatory factors are all poten-
tially endogenous, and therefore one can only hope to infer correlations, not
causation as the model predicts. In our empirical study, we take the view
that if correlation between HHIj and πi is not substantial, the possibility of
a causal link can be rejected straightaway; see also Slade (2004).
1There are other theoretical models with related predictions; see, for example, Green
and Porter (1984), Slade (1989) and Kandori (1991).
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2.1.2 “Chicago-school” view
The main criticism of the SCP model, however, was on theoretical grounds.
Several “Chicago-school” economists argued that the direction of causality
was wrong. In their view, profits drive market structure and not the other
way round (Stigler, 1950, 1968; Demsetz, 1973). In competitive markets, the
most eﬃcient producers grow and capture market share. This implies that
industries where variation in productivity is very high, the most eﬃcient firms
are large and dominate the market; this is the source of positive correlation
between profitability and market share.
In the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982), firms enter the market
unsure of their quality, and learn their true eﬃciency or productivity levels
by observing noisy cost and profit signals. If they are eﬃcient, they grow
over time and capture market share. In other words, the distribution of firm
eﬃciencies determines market structure.
The main prediction of the above model is that market share of the
firm is an important determinant of profitability. Empirically, the market
share model implies a relationship between profitability (πi) and market
share (SHAREi), where HHIj and xi may appear as additional explana-
tory variables. Further, since market share is determined solely by the initial
eﬃciency draw, this implies a model where variation in profitability is mainly
explained by firm eﬀects, but industry eﬀects may also be relevant.
There are many extensions and variations on the above model. Eric-
son and Pakes (1995) proposed the active learning model which is similar
to Jovanovic (1982), except that firms can change their eﬃciency level by
investments in human capital and R&D. Relatedly, in previous work by Bain
(1956), the positive correlation between profitability and market share arises
from the argument that small firms may not be able to fully exploit economies
of scale, and therefore have lower profit margins. These variations suggest
consideration of other firm specific variables, such as age and size, within the
market share model. In our empirical setting, these additional factors encom-
passed within firm eﬀects. Finally, Cowling and Waterson (1976) suggest a
diﬀerent model where the margin is directly proportional to market share,
while industry average profitability is proportional to market concentration.
This model highlights the possibility that both the market share and the
market structure model may coexist.
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2.1.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
The third model considered in Slade (2004) is based on the CAPM (Sharpe,
1964; Lintner, 1965) developed in the financial economics literature. This
model predicts that the rate of return (πi) is a linear function of the beta
factor of the firm times the excess current return on the market portfolio over
and above the risk free rate, (rmt − rf). Since the beta factor is a function
of the risk class to which the firm belongs (RISKi) and (rmt − rf) is a time
specific factor, the first order Taylor series expansion of the CAPM provides
a simple model with firm and time eﬀects, but no industry eﬀects.2
2.1.4 Empirical evidence from western economies
The empirical literature on determinants of profitability is equally large and
diverse. First, there is a substantial body of research in empirical IO that
seeks to validate either the market structure or the market share model. Ev-
idence in favour of either model is limited and, as the theoretical model in
Cowling and Waterson (1976) demonstrates, both these models can hold
simultaneously. However, the empirical literature is inconclusive in this
matter.3 Further, while the SCP paradigm has become very unfashionable
in the IO literature,4 it remains an important tool for antitrust authorities.
There is similarly a large literature in management science studying the
relative importance of firm versus industry eﬀects. Commencing with the
contributions of Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991) several researchers
have studied the determinants of corporate profitability in the United States.
For one school of thought, inter industry diﬀerences constitute the main
source of variation in performance, while firm specific characteristics are less
important. For the other, the orientation of a firm’s behavior towards making
choices and firm characteristics, such as resources, capabilities and strategies,
determine firm performance. Even in weak industries, stars consistently out-
perform the others, and in high-profit industries failures occur due to mis-
2We consider the above three models in this paper. Slade (2004) also considers a
fourth model taken from the literature on natural resource economics. This model is not
strictly relevant to our work here, but can also be simply represented in our setting by a
combination of firm eﬀects and a industry-time interaction eﬀect.
3See Schmalensee (1989) for a summary of the empirical evidence.
4Slade (2004) argues that the main reason for this was persistent criticism on both
theoretical and empirical fronts.
7
takes by firms. Over two decades of research based on US corporate data,
general consensus has emerged that industry factors explain a relatively small
proportion of the variations and a larger proportion of profit variations are
attributable to firm or business specific characteristics. Macroeconomic fac-
tors, identified by time eﬀects, and interaction between industry and time,
representing diﬀerent cyclical patterns in diﬀerent industries, also contribute
to profit variations. However, a substantial remainder of the variation in
firm-level profitability cannot be attributed to any of these factors. Analysis
for other OECD countries confirms this pattern (Schmalensee, 1989).
In a significant departure from both the above two strands of the litera-
ture, Slade (2004) put four alternative theoretical models of firm profitability
to test. Using detailed business unit data on both market share and market
structure for a number of markets, and including firms that potentially oper-
ate in several markets, she tests the main predictions of two of these models
directly. There is evidence of a positive relationship between profitability
and market structure, but not much empirical support for the hypothesis
that high profits are an indication of monopoly power.
Like Slade (2004), we are interested in empirically evaluating the relevance
of these alternative theories. However, our emerging economy context is
very diﬀerent, and further, we are primarily interested in understanding the
impact of the economic liberalisation process on the industrial context in
which Indian firms operate. Also, our data, accounting information on a
sample of quoted companies, are very diﬀerent. In line with the requirements
of our research question and data, we follow Scott and Pascoe (1986) in
replacing firm and industry variables, such as firm market shares and industry
concentration ratios, with firm, industry and time fixed eﬀects.5
Next, we discuss the institutional context of our empirical study.
5We are aware that this empirical approach precludes determining the sources of the
diﬀerences between firm and industry eﬀects. However, our approach is fit for the specific
purpose of evaluating alternative models and further, is very robust to omitted variables,
endogeneity, parametric distributional assumptions, and similar mispecifications.
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2.2 Institutional backdrop
2.2.1 The Indian context
Our analysis covers the sixteen-year period from 1980-81 to 1995-96. We
divide the period into three consecutive phases of five years, six years and
five years respectively. The first five-year phase, one largely of command
and control, notwithstanding a shift of regulatory policy in favour of private
business, is from 1980-81 to 1984-85. The second six-year phase, one of partial
liberalisation, runs from 1985-86 to 1990-91. The third five-year phase, one
of full liberalisation, runs from 1991-92 to 1995-96.
The year 1980 is associated with the commencement of attempts to liber-
alise the Indian economy. In 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to oﬃce and
commenced liberalisation (Bhagwati, 1993; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
These reforms were largely probusiness, aimed at favouring the interests of
incumbents rather than entrants or consumers (Rodrik and Subramanian,
2005). But severe political turmoil intervened and the period remained one
of regulation and control (Marathe, 1989), with severe policy distortions
(Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003), and she was assassinated in 1984.
In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi took oﬃce as head of government and commenced
industrial reform activities on a fresh slate, but very soon the government
was involved in scandal. Nevertheless, the probusiness stance of industrial
policy continued, and there was modest progress in trade policy reform (Das,
2003); see also Rodrik and Subramanian (2005).
In 1991, a new government took oﬃce and had to react to a severe balance
of payments crisis. Led by technocrats like Manmohan Singh, one its first acts
was to liberalise the economy by removing past distortions, so as to promote
economic growth (Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003). The reforms pursued in
this period, focusing on trade liberalisation and reduction of entry barriers
(Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001; Kathuria, 2002), were largely promarket in
nature rather than probusiness (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
Thus, each phase was distinct in terms of its political economy and insti-
tutional features relating to industrial and financial policies. From a license-
permit-quota focus prior to the 1980s, the economy moved towards ‘reforms
by stealth’ in the first half of the 1980s, which gave way to ‘reforms with
reluctance’ in the later half of the 1980s, and finally to ‘reforms by storm’
since 1991 (Bhagwati, 1993). Indeed, the above stages of economic liberali-
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sation represent a natural experiment with significant ramifications for firms
behaviours and market structure (Majumdar, 1996).
Further, theory suggests important roles for demand conditions in shaping
the nature of inter-firm interactions and collusive behaviour (Machin and
van Reenen, 1993). Therefore, in addition to controlling for time eﬀects in
our empirical analysis, we ensure that each of the above phases are broadly
similar in terms of the economic cycle.6
2.2.2 Importance of institutional context
A fundamental driver of variation in economic experience between diﬀerent
countries has been the diﬀerences in institutions (Rodriguez and Rodrik,
2000). The microeconomic institutional infrastructure determines the dis-
tribution of resources within an economy, and shapes the outcomes feasible
from organised activity.
In an institutional environment with strong barriers to entry and speci-
fication of detailed rules for the conduct of business, firm behaviour may be
oriented towards political rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) and politician man-
agement (Fisman, 2001). Resources may be directed towards political as op-
posed to eﬃciency enhancing activities (Becker, 1985). Firm eﬀects picked
up may predominantly relate to political and rent seeking tasks.
Thus, the importance of firm eﬀects, in an economy such as India, will
be strongly tempered by the degree to which firms will have operated within
a controlled environment with strong barriers to entry, exit and conduct of
business. Firm performance will be determined both by newly emergent
market forces, economic factors and the legacy of economic planning and
control (Mohan and Aggarwal, 1990; Bardhan, 2005).
The emergence of a promarket, rather than probusiness, institutional con-
text could promote an industrial environment where margins for the average
firm may get squeezed while competion enhances eﬃciency, and therefore
profitability, of the leaders (Kambhampati and Parikh, 2003; Bhaumik and
Dimova, 2004). Thus, firm eﬀects may be important in both scenarios, at
the same time as market structure may contribute to profitability diﬀerences.
Studying the determinants of profitability diﬀerences between firms against
6Specifically, based on peak and trough dates of growth rate cycles (ECRI, 2010), the
Indian economy spent approximately half of the time in growth and contraction phases
during each of the three sub-periods considered here.
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the context of institutional change in an emerging market economy is there-
fore an important counterpart to theory.
3 Data and Empirical Model
We now turn towards empirical validation of the theoretical models and eval-
uation of the role of institutions in the transition context of India. We dis-
cuss our data and present descriptive features, followed by our model and
the econometric methods.
3.1 Data description
We use data drawn from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) database on fi-
nancial accounts of non-government public limited companies. The choice of
the data is driven by two important factors. First, since the analysis spans
sixteen years, we had to select a database with good and consistent coverage
over this entire period. Second, it is necessary to use a database that paid
attention to changes in accounting norms over this period.
The RBI database is an elaborate and consistent database on public lim-
ited Indian companies in the private sector maintained by the RBI since
1950—51 onwards. The data are based on balance sheets, profit and loss ac-
counts and annual reports of companies.7 The overall dataset comprises a
pooled cross-section, where a diﬀerent sample of companies is surveyed each
year. The data are widely perceived to have representative coverage of most
sub-segments of the Indian corporate sector.8 It was important that the cov-
erage was not only representative of the population in each year, but that it
was consistent over the long period of time covered in the study.
7Aggregates based on these accounts inform policy and are used for compilation of
national accounts. They are also used for estimating the growth and performance of the
real sector of the Indian economy.
8The RBI public limited company data represents approximately 85 per cent of the
paid-up capital of 86 3-digit industries (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001). Additionally,
the data are standardized into a common format across companies and time, maintain-
ing consistency in accounting definitions. While proprietary, the RBI database has been
commonly used for empirical work related to policy on the Indian corporate sector by
government bodies and private researchers.
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In our analysis, we exclude diversified firms, state owned enterprises and
privately held limited companies. Further, we confine our analysis to the
manufacturing sector. While some previous studies have attempted to dis-
tinguish between business, corporate parent and industry eﬀects, our focus
here is largely on firm and industry eﬀects.9 SOEs are excluded because
their operating business environment is very diﬀerent from private sector
firms, which constitute our main focus of analysis. Data on privately held
limited companies are not publicly available on a consistent basis. These
firms are typically much smaller than public limited companies, and their in-
clusion would introduce additional challenges in interpretation of firm eﬀects;
see also Slade (2004). Likewise, firms in service industries, including financial
companies, are excluded because their behaviour over diﬀerent stages of the
economic cycle tend to be very diﬀerent from manufacturing firms.
Between 1, 600 and 3, 500 companies are surveyed each year. However,
while the RBI systematically collects data on large public limited firms, en-
tries and exits in and out of the sample are a result of smaller firms that do
not submit data rather than actual business attrition. Our core analysis is
based on the balanced panel of 450 firms for the period 1980-81 to 1995-96,
aggregating to a total of 7, 200 firm-year observations. These data are clas-
sified into 22 industries, ensuring that each industry has at least 6 firms in
each year.
Schamalensee (1989) discusses the relative merits of diﬀerent accounting
and economic measures for firm level returns. We main measure of profitabil-
ity is return on assets (ROA), the ratio of profits net of depreciation, interest
and tax to total assets. However, we also used operating profit margin (ratio
of gross profits to sales) for robustness checks. Since the results for the latter
measure are similar, we only report the results for ROA.
Table 1 presents a summary of the cross sectional distribution of ROA
in 10 selected industries over the period of the study. There are substantial
diﬀerences in profitability across industries and over time. We verify that
the time-series of average ROA at the sectoral level is stationary.10 The
9Most of the firms in the sample are single business firms. While the RBI database
includes several diversified firms, profits and financial characteristics for the diﬀerent busi-
ness units of these firms are not separately recorded. Hence, we omit diversified firms from
our analysis. Therefore, we cannot consider business and corporate level eﬀects separately.
10Panel unit root tests (Levin and Lin, 1993; Levin et al., 2002) reject the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity at the 1 percent level of significance.
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cross sectional distribution of ROA is negatively skewed for most industries
and has high kurtosis. Therefore, the normality assumption, important for
estimation of variance components, may be suspect. Hence, we pay attention
to robust inference techniques.
3.2 Empirical model and tentative hypotheses
As discussed earlier, we follow Scott and Pascoe (1986) in working with a
model where firm level profitability is explained by firm, industry and time
specific eﬀects, industry × time interaction, and an idiosyncratic error term.
Accordingly, the profitability πijt of firm i in industry j at time t is modeled
as:
πijt = μ+ αi + βj + γt + δjt + εijt, (1)
where μ is the mean profitability, and α’s, β’s, γ’s, δ’s and ε’s denote firm
eﬀects, industry eﬀects, time eﬀects, industry × time interaction eﬀects and
idiosyncratic errors respectively. This empirical specification captures the
basic features of all the three theoretical models discussed in Section 2. The
market structure model based on the SCP paradigm predicts the dominance
of industry eﬀects, while the market share “Chicago school” models predict
the importance of firm eﬀects. The simultaneous importance of both firm
and industry eﬀects is also consistent with the above models, and so are time
eﬀects or industry × time interactions. The CAPM predicts the importance
of firm and time eﬀects, but not industry eﬀects.
Admittedly, the model in equation 1 is not useful for causal analysis;
see also Slade (2004). However, it has two important advantages. First,
the model has a very elaborate specification, negating the plausibility of any
omitted variable bias. Second, the empirical model is ideally suited for inves-
tigation of the relative importance of firm, industry and time specific factors,
or industry-time interactions, in explaining variation in firm level profitabil-
ity. However, because of potential endogeneity, the individual estimates of
these eﬀects cannot be assigned conceptual interpretation.
In the context of prior empirical evidence and the institutional setting
discussed earlier, we now attempt to advance some tentative hypotheses re-
garding the validity of competing theoretical models in the transition context
in India. Since the work of Mueller (1977), persistence in profitability has
been a stylised fact consistently observed in corporate sectors around the
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world. Further, Glen et al. (2001, 2003) find weaker persistence in devel-
oping countries, including India, supporting the counterintuitive hypothesis
that intensity of competition in these countries may be comparable to, or
even greater than, advanced economies. This suggests that firm eﬀects may
provide an important explanation for profitability diﬀerences in Indian in-
dustry, potentially increasing over the diﬀerent stages of the liberalisation
process with the emergence of a market economy. In the period of probusi-
ness reforms, these firm eﬀects could arise from abilities in rent-seeking and
politician management (Krueger, 1974; Fisman, 2001), while in the pro-
market “reforms by storm” period, firm eﬀects may truly reflect eﬃciency
(Jovanovic, 1982).
In sharp contradiction to the above argument, the SCP paradigm is gener-
ally regarded as an useful model in developing countries, both for regulation
and research. In the Indian context, for example, Kumar (1990) finds ev-
idence in favour of an extended version of the SCP (Porter, 1979) where
there are strategic groups within sectors with the possibility of mobility bar-
ricrs between the groups. Further, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) argue
that promarket polies in the “reforms by stealth” and “reforms with reluc-
tance” phases aimed at sustaining monopolistic advantages and entry barriers
within Indian industry. This would suggest dominant industry eﬀects during
the first two phases of liberalisation. Industry eﬀects may also be present in
the post liberalisation promarket regime, perhaps in combination with firm
eﬀects, like in the Cowling and Waterson (1976) model.
Therefore, the implications for the relative importance of firm and indus-
try eﬀects in Indian corporate sector, based on prior evidence and research
on the institutional setting, are ambiguous. The importance of the CAPM
appears to be equally uncertain. In the context of the model in equation 1,
CAPM implies that both firm and time specific factors should be important,
but not industry eﬀects. However, the prominence of an aggregate economic
factor, representing return on the market portfolio, appears to be debat-
able in the Indian transition context. It has been observed that until the
1990s, there were no conventional business cycles in India, and fluctuations
in economic activity were primarily due to weather conditions (Patnaik and
Sharma, 2002).
The real test between alternate theories is, therefore, empirical. Our
inferences on this question rest on relative importance of the diﬀerent eﬀects,
and their changes over the three stages of the liberalisation process.
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3.3 Econometric methods
To infer on the relative importance of the diﬀerent eﬀects, we assume indepen-
dence between the eﬀects, and between error and the eﬀects. Unconditional
independence may not be reasonable; therefore, we assume independence con-
ditional on, or subject to, the inclusion of an adequate choice of interaction
eﬀects. In particular, it may be unreasonable to assume that the industry ef-
fects are independent of the year eﬀects, because firms in diﬀerent industries
are potentially aﬀected diﬀerently by changes in the economic environment.
This dependence is incorporated in the model by including industry × year
interaction eﬀects.
First, we estimated the above model with firm, industry and time fixed
eﬀects using the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) method, as well as a
model with only firm and industry-time fixed eﬀects. In either case, we also
estimated a random eﬀects specification, under the assumption that all the
main and interaction eﬀects included in the model, as well as the error term,
arise randomly and independently of each other. The validity of this random
eﬀects assumption is judged by the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), compar-
ing the consistent fixed eﬀects estimator with the random eﬀects estimator,
which is eﬃcient when the random eﬀects assumption holds. In both cases,
we find overwhelming support for the random eﬀects assumption, where the
null hypothesis that the fixed eﬀects and random eﬀects estimates are the
same cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. We, therefore,
assume a random eﬀects specification henceforth.11 Under this model, the
variance of πijt, denoted σ2π, can be expressed as:
σ2π = σ
2
α + σ
2
β + σ
2
γ + σ
2
δ + σ
2
ε . (2)
This linear split of σ2π into components corresponding to distinct sources
of variation helps us assess the relative importance of the various eﬀects in
explaining overall variability in πijt.
Further, we assume Gaussian random eﬀects. For the random eﬀects
model (equation 1) and the corresponding variance decomposition (equation
2), we choose methods that are robust to this distributional assumption for
moderate sample sizes and allow the following kinds of inference:
11The random eﬀects model is useful for inferences on the relative magnitudes of diﬀerent
eﬀects, but not on their specific values. In any case, estimates of the individual fixed eﬀects
are not meaningful in this case because of potential endogeneity.
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1. Estimate the contribution of each factor to the overall variation in
profitability, variance components, both in absolute terms (σ2α, σ2β, σ
2
γ,
σ2δ and σ
2
ε) and in relative terms (for example, σ2α/σ2π or σ2α/ (σ2π − σ2ε)).
2. Test for significance of each variance component: H0 : σ2θ = 0 against
the alternative H1 : σ2θ > 0 for θ ∈ {α, β, γ, δ}.
3. Assess the relative importance of diﬀerent eﬀects by testing hypotheses
such as H0 : σ2α = σ2β versus H1 : σ2α > σ2β.
4. Test for transition over the period of liberalisation by testing hypothe-
ses such as H0 : σ2α,t = σ2α,t−1 against the alternative H1 : σ2α,t > σ2α,t−1.
Thus, in the context of understanding the relative importance of firm and
industry eﬀects within the dynamic Indian environment, we use a method to
robustly estimate, and conduct hypothesis tests on, the variance components.
In combination with the random eﬀects model, the above model and meth-
ods provide a nice empirical framework to study the relative importance of
various sources of variation in profitability, as well as to understand changes
in these eﬀects over diﬀerent phases of reform.
We use maximum likelihood (ML) estimators under the assumption of
Gaussian random eﬀects.12 This estimator of variance components has sev-
eral merits. First, the ML method is asymptotically eﬃcient under the main-
tained distributional assumptions, and the resulting estimators have standard
Gaussian large sample distributions. Second, unlike some other competing
variance component estimators, this method does not produce negative vari-
ance components estimates. Third, the ML estimator is quite robust to
distributional assumptions (Brown and Mosteller, 1991).
Nevertheless, since the Gaussian distribution assumption is potentially
violated in our data, we check robustness of our results in two ways. First,
we consider the full unbalanced panel (which is much larger than the bal-
anced panel) and compare our ML estimates with subsample estimates (Poli-
tis et al., 1999) based on the unbalanced data.13 In addition to eﬃciency,
this subsampling approach has the advantage of allowing for random eﬀects
12The ML estimator for the one way random eﬀects model is discussed in Greene (2008,
547—549). We use a simple extension to our three way model with interaction (equation
1).
13We describe our subsampling procedure in the following section.
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distributions that can be approximated by mixtures of the Gaussian distri-
bution, which constitutes a very large class of distributions. Second, we use
an alternative measure of profitability, the profit margin, and verify that
inferences are qualitatively similar to those based on ROA.
Based on ML estimates of the variance components, we now describe
our hypothesis tests. For testing the hypothesis H0 : σ2θ = 0 versus the
alternative H1 : σ2θ > 0 for θ ∈ {α, β, γ, δ}, we use the Breusch and Pagan
(1980) test, which is asymptotically equivalent to the Lagrange multiplier
test. Compared to the traditional Lagrange multiplier test, it is more robust
to departures from normality (Koenkar, 1981).14
For the hypothesis that firm eﬀects dominate industry eﬀects, H0 : σ2α =
σ2β versus H1 : σ2α > σ2β, we use asymptotic normality of the maximum
likelihood estimates. To study the eﬀect of institutional change, we examine
whether the eﬀects have changed significantly between the diﬀerent phases of
liberalisation. This involves tests of hypotheses about the temporal stability
of firm and industry eﬀects, such as: H0 : σ2α,t1 = σ
2
α,t2 versus H1 : σ
2
α,t1 >
σ2α,t2. These tests are also based on asymptotic normality of the ML variance
component estimates.
4 Results and discussion
We obtain ML estimates of the variance components (equation 2) using on
a balanced panel of 450 firms for the 16 years 1980-81 to 1995-96. These
firms belong to 22 industries,15 each of which included at least 6 firms every
year. Inferences were drawn on the relative importance of firm, industry and
time (year) eﬀects, and on the changes in variance components over the three
phases of transition.
14Like the Lagrange multiplier test, the test exhibits local asymptotic eﬃciency and
takes account of the fact that the null hypothesis lies on the boundary of the parameter
space.
15Namely: Food products & beverages; Sugar; Tobacco; Cotton textiles; Man-made
textiles; Silk and rayon; Jute & jute products; Paper & paper products; Chemical fertilisers
& pesticides; Dyes; Paints & varnishes; Pharmaceuticals & medicines; Rubber & rubber
products; Plastics and plastic products; Glass & ceramics; Cement; Metals; Fabricated
metal products; Machinery & machine tools; Electrical machinery & apparatus; Radio,
television & communication equipment; and Automobiles & transport equipment.
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To check for robustness, we use the subsampling approach to draw similar
inferences based on the full usable sample — an unbalanced panel of 2, 030
firms.
4.1 Variance component estimates
The ML estimates of variance components separately for the three regimes
are presented in the panel A of Table 2. In panels B and C, we report the
variance components as percentages of the total variance in return on assets,
and explained variance (bσ2π − bσ2ε), respectively.16
Table 2 reveals that variance of firm level profitability has progressively
increased over the three phases of liberalisation, from 62.98 in the ‘reforms by
stealth’ regime to 79.6 during ‘reforms with reluctance’ and rose further to
138.7 in the five years from 1991. Firm eﬀects were important determinants of
diﬀerences in profitability during all the three regimes, accounting for 33−50
percent of total variation, while the share of industry eﬀects ranged between
1 and 12 percent. Year and industry × year eﬀects were much smaller. The
unexplained portion of the variance in profitability accounted for 45 − 57
percent of variations in profitability among the firms.
The dominance of firm eﬀects is in agreement with the arguments of Glen
et al. (2003) that corporate sectors in developing countries, including India,
experience a high degree of competition. While the finding of competitive in-
dustry in a developing country context is somewhat counterintuitive, Singh
(2003) lists several pro-competition structural contexts that fit the Indian
case well; namely, (a) lower sunk costs of entry, which potentially leads to
higher entry and exit and more competition (Hopenhayn, 1992), (b) faster
growth of demand under imperfect competition and endogenous entry (As-
plund and Nocke, 2006), (c) pro-competition industrial policies, such as price
control, and (d) firm dynamics facilitated by economies of scale and scope,
which in turn are promoted by large conglomerates. Thus, there appears to
be good support for the market share model.
In contrast, support for the CAPM based model is weak, because year
eﬀects and industry-year interactions are practically nonexistent. This is
not surprising, since conventional business cycles were absent in the Indian
16The results for the other profitability ratio, gross profit margin on sales, are very
similar and not reported separately.
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economy over the period under study, and financial markets functioned in
very diﬀerent ways.17 This also suggests that collusion may not have the
cyclical patterns typical of western economies.
The estimates also clearly reveal the changing balance between firm and
industry eﬀects as the Indian economy moved from a regime of regulation
pre-1985, to partial liberalisation, and finally to a phase of comprehensive
liberalisation since post 1991. The proportion of variation in ROA explained
by firm eﬀects was higher in the ‘reforms with reluctance’ phase, at 49.5
percent, perhaps as firms learnt to function within a changing institutional
environment, relative to the regulated period when it was 33.8 percent. At
38.7 percent, it was somewhat lower in the post 1991 period, mainly because
the increase in total variance was driven by industry eﬀects.
The share of industry eﬀects was very small in the ‘reforms by stealth’ and
‘reforms with reluctance’ regimes, at 3.5 percent and 1.1 percent respectively.
This provides evidence against the market structure model before promarket
reforms were unleashed post 1991. It is possible that regulation prevented
monopoly power in many sectors, particularly those where large state firms
were not operating; see also Singh (2003). The size of industry eﬀects, how-
ever, increased sharply to 11.8 percent in the ‘reforms by storm’ period. In
a contestable markets environment, which the institutional changes brought
about, variation in concentration across industries provided an important
explanation for increased variation of firms’ profitability.
4.2 Absolute and relative importance
Statistical tests for the hypothesis that variance of firm eﬀects and industry
eﬀects are zero are reported in Table 3. We also report on the test that
firm eﬀects and industry eﬀects are equally important against the alternative
that variation in firm eﬀects is larger than industry eﬀects. The tests are
conducted separately for the three regimes.18
The tests for significance of firm eﬀects, H0 : σ2α = 0 versus H1 : σ2α > 0,
reject the null hypothesis of zero firm eﬀects. The significant firm eﬀects in
all the three phases, suggest that firm capabilities have mattered at all times
in Indian industry, both under a controlled regime when rent seeking was
17Singh (1997) provides a good discussion in the Indian context.
18Time (year) and industry-year eﬀects are not significant in any phase. The corre-
sponding tests are not reported.
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rewarded, and under liberalisation, both partial and more comprehensive,
when eﬃciency and productive performance was rewarded.
However, unlike firm eﬀects, tests for the significance of industry eﬀects,
H0 : σ2β = 0 versus H1 : σ2β > 0, provide mixed evidence and demonstrate
an important dimension of the liberalisation process. In line with inferences
drawn from the proportions, the null hypothesis of zero industry eﬀects is re-
jected in period post 1991, when the economy entered the ‘reforms by storm’
phase, but not before. These significant industry eﬀects in the promarket
liberalisation period, when industry factors began to influence firms’ prof-
itability, show that in the controlled and regulated environment of Indian
industry prior to liberalisation, it did not matter so much which industry a
firm belonged to. In other words, our evidence would suggest that the SCP
paradigm did not hold over either of these two probusiness regimes. Active
antitrust regulation, combined with price controls and protection against ex-
ternal competition, ensured that there was negligible variation in rates of
return across sectors. This contingency no longer held after the opening up
of markets. The choice of industry, and subsequent positioning within it,
started to matter significantly in influencing profits.
Finally, we evaluate whether firm eﬀects and industry eﬀects were equal
or if firm eﬀects dominated industry eﬀects: H0 : σ2α = σ2β versus H1 : σ2α >
σ2β. We find that firm eﬀects were larger than industry eﬀects under all
policy regimes. Thus, the firm’s ability to operate appropriately within the
prevailing business environment has always been rewarded, whether this be
rent-seeking and political behaviour in the earlier phases, or eﬃciency in the
post-liberalisation period.
4.3 Change in eﬀects over transition phases
Further, against the context of a transition, it is important to assess if firm
and industry eﬀects have changed significantly over diﬀerent phases of lib-
eralisation. Table 4 reports tests of the null hypothesis that the variances
of firm eﬀects, industry eﬀects and the sum of industry random eﬀects and
industry-year interactions remained unchanged in the transition from the
‘reforms by stealth’ regime to ‘reforms with reluctance’, and subsequently
to the ‘reforms by storm’ period. In each case, the alternative hypothesis
is that the corresponding variance component has increased; for example,
H0 : σ2α,t = σ2α,t−1 versus H1 : σ2α,t > σ2α,t−1.
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Table 4 shows that firm eﬀects have increased significantly as the In-
dian economy moved from a command and control to a partially liberalised
regime, and again when that regime gave way to a promarket liberalisation
regime. Remarkably, the increase in the variance of ROA in the first of the
above two transitions was almost entirely due to increase in the firm-level
variance component. In the second transition, from probusiness to promarket
regime, about half of the increase was due to residual variance, while firm
and industry eﬀects split the other half almost equally.
Within the institutional context of Indian liberalisation, why might firm
eﬀects have become more important in the partial liberalisation regime? Pre-
vious research suggests that the stance of industrial reforms did not substan-
tially change over the first two phases of liberalisation. Rodrik and Sub-
ramanian (2005) argue that over this period policy was probusiness, rather
than promarket, while Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) claim that reforms
based on fiscal expansionism during this period was ineﬀective. It would
appear that, with time the population of firms was sorted according to their
ability to earn higher returns through rent-seeking and political opportunis-
tic behaviour. This contributed to the observed rise in the variation of firm
eﬀects and profitability.
In contrast, promarket reforms and competitive forces were unleashed in
the third regime, leading to a rise in both firm and industry eﬀects. Since
causal patterns cannot be inferred from our study, it is as such unclear as to
whether the market structure or the market share model holds in the post-
liberalisation period, or whether a combination of both was active. However,
in so far as firm eﬀects continued to dominate industry eﬀects, one may infer
that eﬃciency was valued by higher profitability. At the same time, liber-
alisation supported the emergence of a competitive market in India where
market concentration, entry barriers and other similar industry level eﬀects
may aﬀect variation in profitability among firms.19
4.4 Subsampling
The assumption of Gaussian distributions for the random eﬀects and the error
term, which underscores the ML estimation method, is strong and unlikely
19We also tested whether industry eﬀects and industry-year interactions together may
have increased from the ‘reforms by stealth’ to the ‘reforms with reluctance’ regime. How-
ever, the null hypothesis of no change over these two phases could not be rejected.
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to be supported by the data.20 While maximum likelihood estimation of
the random eﬀects model is generally robust to such misspecification (Brown
and Mosteller, 1991), we also verify the robustness of our main empirical
findings by relaxing the distributional assumption. Specifically, rather than
the balanced panel used above, we estimate variance components for the
random eﬀects model based on subsamples drawn from the fullest unbalanced
panel data available in the RBI database. This approach oﬀers three main
advantages in our case.
First, the subsampling methodology (Politis and Romano, 1994; Politis
et al., 1999) is powerful and simple to use, and can be readily applied to con-
sistently approximate the sampling distribution of sample statistics under
minimal assumptions. In our case, these sample statistics are ML estimates
of variance components. Second, while the Gaussian assumption may be ten-
uous in our specific application, the subsampling methodology will still be
valid so long as the unknown random eﬀects distribution can be represented
by a mixture of Gaussian densities. This class of mixture distributions is
very large, and encompasses a very broad range of higher moments (includ-
ing positive and negative skewness and excess kurtosis). While estimation
of variance components by subsampling is consistent in this case, the con-
vergence rate needs to be estimated by a preliminary round of subsampling
(Politis et al., 1999). Third, since our model includes a wide collection of
random eﬀects (firm, industry and time eﬀects, plus industry-time interac-
tions), our model may not be susceptible to sample selection bias due to
attrition within the population of firms. Nevertheless, one can imagine that
if observations from the tails of the profitability (or firm eﬀects) distribution
were self selected out of the balanced sample, estimates of variance compo-
nents or the total varition in ROA may be biased; the subsampling approach
addresses any such potential selection issues.
We now turn to a brief discussion of the methodology. The idea underly-
ing subsampling is simple, entailing computation of a statistic for subsamples
of the data selected without replacement. The values of the statistic for the
diﬀerent subsamples are then used to estimate moments of the statistic and
to construct an approximation to the sampling distribution. In particular,
the sample mean based on a large number of subsamples can be used to
20The cross sectional distributions of ROA, our measure of profitability, do not exhibit
zero skewness (Table 1), and this clearly points to violation of this assumption.
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estimate an unknown population mean, and the sample standard deviation
provides an estimate of the standard error (Politis et al., 1999).
Our implementation of the methodology is based on drawing subsamples
from the 2, 030 firms have been in the dataset for at least six years.21 First,
we draw 100 subsamples of 675 firms,22 ensuring that each of the 2, 030 firms
appears at least once in the sample. Second, for each of these 100 subsam-
ples, we obtain ML estimates of variance components corresponding to firm,
industry and time eﬀects.23 In addition to providing inference similar to
usual bootstrap aggregation (bagging), this approach based on subsampling
also vastly facilitates computation. In fact, the high computation intensity
associated with the full bootstrap approach would render computation based
on 2, 030 firms nearly impossible.
The subsampling estimates of variance components, as well as other re-
lated inferences, are very similar to the balanced panel results. Specifically,
magnitudes of estimated variance components corresponding to firm, indus-
try and year eﬀects are very similar to the ML estimates. In particular, firm
eﬀects cover 36.1 percent, 45.4 percent and 41.8 percent of the total variance
of firm profitability in the three phases of liberalisations respectively; corre-
spondingly, industry eﬀects comprise 4.7 percent, 4.2 percent and 5.6 percent
respectively, while year eﬀects explain 4.0 percent, 1.1 percent and 0.5 per-
cent of total variance respectively. Further, firm eﬀects dominate year eﬀects
and the null hypothesis of no year eﬀects is supported in all three phases, and
tests on changes in firm and industry eﬀects over the three phases provide
very similar patterns to the balanced data case. The only major point of
diﬀerence in inferences lies in significant industry eﬀects in each of the three
phases, which we interpret as the result of much larger sample size.24
21The total number of firms that has ever appeared in the RBI database over the 16
year period under analysis is 3, 187.
22In the current case, a subsampling proportion of about one-third of the total firms
(2, 030/3 ≈ 677) produces estimators with finite sample properties comparable to a full
bootstrap.
23The industry-year interactions were not included because the maximum likelihood
procedure failed to converge for most subsamples. Further, iterations of the expectation-
maximization algorithm indicate that the variance component for industry-year interac-
tions was zero in the above cases.
24Detailed tables of results are not reported in the interest of space.
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5 Conclusions
We study variation in firm level profitability against the backdrop of eco-
nomic reforms in India with a view to understand the relevance of several
theoretical models of profitability. Using panel data on Indian public limited
manufacturing companies over the period 1980-81 to 1995-96, we examine the
relative importance of firm, industry and time eﬀects, as well as industry-time
interactions, in explaining profitability diﬀerences.
Our work highlights the importance of accounting for institutional factors
in the analysis of profitability variations among firms. In transition economies
and emerging markets, it is particularly important to understand the role
of government policy in influencing the strength of the eﬀects. We do so
by conducting comparative analyses over three periods, each capturing a
diﬀerent institutional regime in Indian industry.
Starting a period of extensive regulatory controls, the Indian economy
went through three stages of progressive liberalisation in the 1980s and early
1990s. Probusiness reforms initiated in the early 1980s were very slow and
had minimal real impact. Then, hesitant and partial domestic reforms were
instituted in 1985, but political diﬃculties intervened. Financial diﬃculties
forced the administration into comprehensive promarket reforms only in 1991.
We assess the shifts in the relative balance of firm eﬀects and industry eﬀects
across the two distinctly separate liberalisation regimes that have unfolded
in India.
We find evidence that liberalisation significantly aﬀects the absolute and
relative importance of firm and industry eﬀects in shaping the profitability
of Indian firms. Firm eﬀects are always important, whether in a command
and control regime, with potential benefits accruing from protectionism and
political rent seeking, or in the competitive market environment where the
firms’ productivities and eﬃciencies are valued. Industry eﬀects are impor-
tant in the promarket reform phase, and time eﬀects do not turn out to be
important.
Further, we find that firm eﬀects get stronger over time as the institutional
forces enhance market contestability. As the market becomes more dominant
in the resource allocation process, relative to the government, so does the
role of eﬃciency, becoming more important in explaining profit variations.
By contrast, industry eﬀects are negligible in the first two phases, and start
being important only once promarket reforms are initiated.
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Our findings have important implications for theory. Though the main
causal implications of the market structure or the market share models can-
not be tested in our setting, some important conclusions can be drawn from
the relative importance of firm, industry and time eﬀects. The market struc-
ture model, on which the structure-conduct-performance paradigm is based,
predicts a causal link from market structure to monopoly profits, and there-
fore to profitability. Since industry eﬀects are negligible during the two
phases in the 1980s, the market structure model appears not to hold be-
fore the full liberalisation regime begins in 1991. In contrast, since firm ef-
fects are always dominant, there is evidence consistent with the market share
model over all the three phases of transition. This model posits the causal
relationship to run in the opposite direction to the market structure model;
firm eﬃciency leads to higher profitability and thereby to more concentrated
markets. Further, since time eﬀects are negligible, there is no evidence for a
CAPM type model predicting a role for both firm and time eﬀects.
The above evidences have crucial policy relevance. While antitrust and
competition authorities in developed countries tend to balance anticompeti-
tive and eﬃciency considerations (Mueller, 1996), those in developing coun-
tries often implicitly believe in a causal link from market structure to prof-
itability (the market structure model). Our results, however, cast serious
doubts on this assumption, particularly in the first two phases before pro-
market reforms were undertaken. Rather, excess profitability in the ‘reforms
by stealth’ and ‘reforms with reluctance’ regimes appear to be driven by firm
capabilities in exploiting political rent-seeking opportunities. This demon-
strates that the nature of competition in any market requires to be carefully
examined before implementing antitrust regulations. Further, like Glen et al.
(2003), our evidences support the view that developing country markets can
sometimes be quite competitive. Since a poor competitive environment and
disregard for profits in corporate investment decisions are often thought to
be important causes for macroeconomic instability and crises, these findings
have crucial importance for macroeconomic policy too.
Further, our results demonstrate that promarket reforms enhance re-
turns to eﬃciency, but also have the potential to introduce a concentration-
profitability link. In other words, market contestability has enhanced indus-
try eﬀects, which is possibly indicative of firms in India choosing the right
industries and segments to enter, do business in and enjoy industry-specific
economic returns.
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At the same time, major institutional changes, such as comprehensive
liberalisation of the industrial economy, increases the volatility of the busi-
ness environment. It is anticipated that increased volatility due to economic
shocks will impact the decisions and performance of firms. Thus, the role of
the time eﬀect, capturing macroeconomic and cyclical strategic interaction
eﬀects, can also become important.
Understanding the causal relationships underlying the market share and
market structure models will be an important area of further research. Like-
wise, more elaborate evaluation of the time eﬀect within an industrial econ-
omy driven by conventional cycles, as well as decomposition of the time eﬀect
is potentially an important exercise within an industrial organisation research
agenda in a post-liberalisation emerging economy context.
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